Crash : In Virginia, private insurers test vehicles for safety. Isn't that the government's job? by Doug Campbell
E
ven without the painful screams, the sound of
screeching tires and busting glass is sickening. On
Tuesday, July 24, a  compact, pointed sled cruising at
31.1 mph hit a 2007 Ford Explorer carrying two BioSIDs, 
or “small-stature female side-impact” dummies. The
impact, centered just between the driver-side doors, threw
the vehicle back 10 feet, shattered the windshield, and 
violently whipped the seat-belted dummies about the 
passenger cabin.
For a moment afterward, it was dead silent. Then the
lights went up. A polo-shirted man stepped up to the crash
scene and quickly began sweeping away the tiny shards 
of glass. A team of at least 12 engineers descended, pushing
computers on wheeled trays. Now it was time to learn the
extent of the dummies’ injuries.
The venue for this staged accident was the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety’s (IIHS) Vehicle Research
Center in Ruckersville, Va., just outside of Charlottesville.
The VRC, for short, conducts about 70 of these side-impact
crashes each year. Each is attended by representatives of the
crashed vehicle’s manufacturing company, in this case Ford.
After all the data are processed, the IIHS will issue a report
card of sorts, grading the Explorer on how effectively it 
protected the dummies. The very best models earn a 
“Top Safety Pick” designation, a Good Housekeeping Seal of
Approval for the automobile industry. Companies often use
IIHS-produced video footage of the most successful crashes
in their TVcommercials.
A “poor” rating, on the other hand, can translate 
to slumping sales and costly redesigns. This was the 
case with the Pontiac Transport, a minivan whose poor 
safety designation in 1997 prompted an overhaul that 
resulted in the newly dubbed Uplander, which garnered 
a good rating from the IIHS in 2005. It goes to show the
sometimes powerful influence IIHS ratings can have.“There
is no question that our ability to do these crash tests and
show the differences among vehicles and their 
different amounts of protection is forcing the automakers to
change their designs,” says Adrian Lund, IIHS president.
In the institute’s early days, rear-end tests were the staple.
Aslim minority of vehicles back then were gathering “good”
safety ratings. Today, the institute rarely bothers with 
rear-end tests because the clear majority of vehicles are per-
forming so well on that standard. Instead, it relies on spot
checks and data provided by the automakers themselves.
An important thing to understand about the IIHS is that
it was created by and still funded by insurance companies. 
It is a nonprofit, private-sector  organization performing
functions that one might otherwise assume would be done
by the government. It does so perhaps in part because of the
goodwill it generates with improving vehicle safety. But it is
also true that the insurers who fund the institute see returns
on their investments in other ways.
With safer vehicles, claims are reduced. Minimizing losses
is obviously useful to insurance firms, in so much as it
reduces potential payouts from claims. Even more useful are
the data gleaned from IIHS crash tests. With information
about the expected severity of injuries — to both vehicle and
human bodies — insurers can fine-tune premiums to 
maximize profits. It is an instance of private-sector initiative
in performing a role — improving automobile safety — 
ordinarily assigned to government.
“We’re bullish enough on the outcome of what the 
institute has done and the data that comes out that it’s well
worth the investment,” says Dave Skove, an executive with
Progressive Insurance who served as IIHS chairman in 2005.
Like many insurers, Progressive has a target underwriting
profit margin, in its case 4 percent. “We’re interested in 
the margin. So if cars tend to be safer and we can help that,
then great.” By extension, it is often in the interest of auto-
mobile companies to reveal information about the safety of
their products, as positive reviews can have a positive impact
on sales. For this reason, automakers are quite cooperative
with IIHS’ efforts.
Early Days
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety was born 
in 1959. Some of the nation’s biggest insurers — Allstate,
State Farm, and Nationwide among them — initially 
put their money into research on driver-education pro-
grams. After a time, the research produced some
surprising findings: Driver-education programs don’t help
reduce crashes among teens, because they tend to help
youths get licensed at younger ages. So IIHS leaders 
decided to take a new approach, turning away from the 
focus on drivers themselves toward the cars they drive. 
They recruited William Haddon, the former head 
of what is now the National Highway and Traffic 
Safety Administration, to study the safety features 
of automobiles.
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YThe government first started con-
sumer car crash tests in the late 1970s.
Until that time, automakers disputed
the notion that “safety sells.” But with
the crash data, consumers for the first
time could compare vehicle ratings
based on objective data. Increasingly,
safety features became standard-issue
selling points.
For years the institute relied on
government data or performed crash
tests on a limited basis. But the 
cavernous building in Ruckersville
allowed IIHS researchers to conduct
their own tests on a vast scale in a 
controlled environment. Besides side-
impact tests, they perform (with
decreasing frequency) rear-end and
frontal crashes. The standard barrier
that slams into tested vehicles aims to
replicate the sort one often finds on
the road in the early 21st century;
namely, sport-utility vehicles or large
trucks. While certainly not perfect
stand-ins for real-world crashes, 
IIHS tests provide objective, easily
comparative results that consumers
and others can use in making 
purchasing decisions.
Today, IIHS announcements make
headlines the world over. On Aug. 15,
for example, came side-impact results
for luxury sedans. Acura and Volvo
were among the manufacturers 
claiming the coveted highest ratings,
while BMW came out as the worst 
performer. A BMW spokesman
explained to the Associated Press that
test results can vary based on a number
of factors: “This was one test on one
day on one car.”
The side-impact test is IIHS’
biggest. The institute says that side-
impact crashes are the most common
type of fatal crash in the nation, killing
about 9,000 people each year. With its
$14 million annual budget, IIHS can
afford about 70 side-impact crashes a
year. Its expenses include buying vehi-
cles right off dealer lots. (Though auto
firms might be quite happy to provide
cars for free, IIHS seeks to ensure that
the cars it tests are identical to the cars
consumers actually buy.) At the VRC,
teams of engineers must be paid, 
dummies built and refurbished (a fully
instrumented dummy costs about
$125,000), and the antiseptically clean
building itself maintained.
Payoff
Insurers pay prorated amounts to keep
IIHS running. Membership accounts
for about 70 percent of the private
passenger insurance market. The IIHS
accomplishes a number of goals for
insurance companies. Among them is
positive PR from nonprofit efforts to
reduce traffic fatalities. Another is the
pecuniary benefit of all the data cap-
tured by the VRC as well as those
collected by the institute’s sister
organization, the Highway Loss Data
Institute (HLDI). Vehicles with side
airbags, better stability control, or 
less susceptibility to crushed bumpers
may get discounts when premiums 
are considered.
The HLDI is a huge trove of 
valuable information for insurance
companies. Basically, participating
firms furnished their own loss infor-
mation, which is then processed and
mined by the HLDI, which in turn
makes public much of its studies, such
as loss rates by vehicle make and
model. Insurance firms can use some
of the same data to precisely price
their premiums.
The weekly, sometimes twice-
weekly, side-impact crash is a veritable
spectator event. Usually on hand are
representatives of various insurance
agency claims departments. On the
day of the Ford Explorer crash, a group
of State Farm adjusters joined engi-
neering students from the nearby
University of Virginia. A viewing deck
overlooks the crash spot, where a
fresh-off-the-lot Explorer has been
wheeled into place.
The crash aims to replicate one 
of the most common accidents: a 
relatively slow-moving vehicle gliding
through an intersection getting hit on
the side by a faster-moving car. In the
hour before the test, engineers make
sure all the sensors are working and
the vehicle is properly prepped. The
Explorer’s original fluids have been
drained with something nonflamma-
ble. Its sides are strapped in tape. The
two small-stature female dummies — a
driver and a passenger directly behind
— have different colors of paint
applied to different parts of their 
bodies. That way, it’s easier after the
crash to see where their bodies came
into contact with the vehicle. (Females
aren’t always tested — the IIHS stable
of dummies includes men, women, 
and children of various sizes. But
females are used most often because
their injuries tend to be the worst in 
side-impact crashes, the IIHS says.)
With four minutes to the crash,
everybody clears the floor. The stage
area is lit by 750,000 watts of light-
bulbs. A bay door rises. Two football
fields away, a sled sits. The countdown
begins, and then the sled begins its
short trip, being pulled along on a belt.
It sounds like a small aircraft about to
take off. It reaches 31.1 mph just before
impact, but watching live it seems
much faster. Then the crash.
Cameras of both the still and
motion variety capture every angle.
Images of the crash immediately 
begin to replay in a loop on TV
monitors posted about the hall. 
The sled hit just where it was supposed
to. The dummies are still in their seats,
a bit slumped. Paint is visible on
airbags where the dummy heads were
slapped. Damage to the vehicle will be
assessed later. (In a nutshell, it’s
totaled.) But information about the
extent of the dummies’ injuries is
quickly forthcoming: The rear passen-
ger came out virtually unscathed, with
good protection for her head and
neck, torso, and pelvis and legs. 
The driver was also in good shape
overall, though the pelvis/leg measure
earned a “marginal” rating because of
the indication that “a fracture of the
pelvis would be possible in a crash of
this severity.”
Aftermath
The results were not exactly surprising
to Ford, a company that has earned
more Top Safety Pick designations in
the past year than any other automaker.
Ford spokesman Dan Jarvis points out 
that the company’s own tests include
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continued on page 43necessary since it is they and not the poor who save and
invest in the innovation-embodied capital formation that
lifts the living standards of all. Moreover, high incomes 
provide both incentive and reward for the entrepreneurs
who propel growth. No one need fear that an unequal 
distribution will condemn them to poverty. The Italian
economist Vilfredo Pareto’s notion of the “circulation of 
the elites” assures that. The ceaseless rise and fall 
of entrepreneurs into and out of the top income bracket 
means that it will be occupied over time by different 
people, many of them drawn from the ranks of the poor. 
The poor replace the rich and the rich the poor in 
never-ending sequence.
In assuming a high degree of mobility across income
groups, Schumpeter may have overlooked an education 
barrier. He failed to acknowledge that a superior education,
increasingly a prerequisite to entrepreneurship and wealth
in today’s high-tech world, is more affordable by the rich,
enabling them and their offspring to stay on top.
Monopolistic firms and monopolistic profits hardly 
worried Schumpeter. He thought that monopolies, unless
protected by government, are short-lived, inherently self-
destroying, and require no antitrust legislation. Their high
profits attract the very rivals and producers of substitute
products that undercut them. For the same reason, he
regarded antitrust laws aimed at breaking up large, 
nonmonopolistic firms as ill-advised. Not only are big 
firms often more efficient than small ones, but their
research and development departments house teams of spe-
cialists functioning collectively — and routinely — as an
entrepreneur who creates innovations that drive growth.
Indeed, the very existence of R&D departments indicates
that big firms realize they must continually innovate to 
stay alive.
Schumpeter’s politically unpopular opinions continued
into the wartime years of the 1940s. He distrusted
Roosevelt, suspecting him of trying to establish a 
dictatorship. And he had mixed emotions about the Axis
nations, Germany and Japan. He despised their military
establishments, leaders, and advisors. But he admired the
people and cultures of the two countries and feared that the
United States would impose punitive reprisals at war’s end.
Most of all, he saw the United States’ wartime ally, the 
Soviet Union, as its chief long-term foe, and thought 
that it would need Germany and Japan to serve as 
buffers against the communist nation. These views found 
little sympathy among Schumpeter’s friends and associates
in the ultrapatriotic environment of the early 1940s, a 
circumstance that caused him much unhappiness.
Schumpeter Today
The new improves upon and kills off the old. True enough.
But what’s new and what’s old may lie in the eye of the 
beholder. Today’s cutting-edge theorist and mathematical
modeler may regard Schumpeter’s analysis as older than old, a 
pre-Keynesian, pre-monetarist, pre-new classical/rational
expectations relic. Accordingly, Schumpeter’s name is stricken
from required reading lists in many top graduate economic 
programs where theory is king. To businessmen, journalists,
and historians seeking not abstract theory but rather practical
understanding of global capitalism, however, his work is as
fresh and insightful as the day he penned it. Journalists speak of
a renaissance of Schumpeterian economics and of a reversal 
of his relative ranking with Keynes. Although McCraw does
not say so, Schumpeter undoubtedly would be pleased, but
hardly surprised, by the revival of his work. It fits his 
description of the zigzag path of doctrinal history in which
sound economic ideas get lost or forgotten only to be 
rediscovered and restored to their proper place. 
AComplaint
A great book deserves a great index, or at the very least 
an adequate one. McCraw’s book has neither. Lacking 
comprehensiveness and precision, the index creates problems
for readers searching for particular items in the text. It is 
inexcusable that the index fails to cover the 188 pages of 
endnotes containing valuable scholarly information and 
constituting a fourth of the book. One can fault the publisher,
not the author, for this oversight. Luckily, it does little to mar
McCraw’s outstanding text. Elizabeth Schumpeter wrote 
that her husband “loved to read biographies.” It’s a sure bet
that he would have enjoyed this one. RF
Thomas M. Humphrey, a retired senior economist at 
the Richmond Fed and long-time editor of its 
Economic Quarterly, has written extensively about the 
history of economic thought. He can be reached at: 
moneyxvelocity@comcast.net
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component-level examinations as well as simulations with
dummies and sometimes cadavers (the latter led by universi-
ties). “It’s a lot more complex when we’re doing the testing,”
Jarvis says. “We have to design for 1,001 different scenarios
and we have to design so that occupants have the best level 
of protection in every one of those scenarios.” With regards
to the possible injuries to the pelvis of Ford Explorer passen-
gers, Jarvis says that even with multiple crash tests in
consistent settings, there will be variation. Also, injuries 
suffered by dummies don’t always translate to injuries suffered
by real people.
That said, Jarvis says Ford sees value in IIHS testing, as
well as that conducted by governments around the world.
“All of the public domain testing has upped the ante and
increased the debate in the level of design and safety testing,”
he says. “We certainly learn things from them.” RF
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